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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Martin Cardenas Cardoza appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conviction by a jury of aid and abet trafficking in methamphetamine and/or 
amphetamine. The state cross-appeals from the district court's denial of the state's 
request for restitution based upon the costs of the prosecutor's time in prosecuting 
Cardoza's case. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Cardoza with "aid and abet trafficking in methamphetamine 
and/or amphetamine." (R., pp.14-15 (capitalization modified).) Cardoza pied not 
guilty to the charge and the case was set for a jury trial. (R., pp.21-22, 49-50.) 
The state filed notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.51-53.) In its 
notice, the state explained that it intended to present testimony by Jose Tapia, a 
confidential informant, "to show the on-going business relationship between the 
Confidential Informant and Martin Cardenas Cardoza and Juan Cardenas Cardoza 
as it pertains to the practices and methods used by the co-defendants to distribute 
and traffic in Methamphetamine, the methods of using various vehicles, meeting, 
storage and distribution locations and the use of other individuals as 
security/counter-surveillance during the distribution of methamphetamine as part of 
the common scheme or plan of action of the defendants, and to show knowledge 
and intent in the present case." (R., p.52.) The state also offered that, under Rule 
404(b ), Oregon Detective Brad Williams would testify "concerning the interstate 
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transportation and storage of methamphetamine by the co-defendants, the use of 
various locations and vehicles as part of the activities of the co-defendants and the 
possession of other quantities of methamphetamine as part of the interrelationship 
and joint activities of the codefendants as evidence of intent, knowledge and 
common scheme as it relates to the possession and efforts to distribute the 
methamphetamine seized as evidence herein." (Id.) 
After the jury was empanelled, a hearing was held on the state's notice of 
intent to use 404(b) evidence, and the district court granted the state's request to 
admit both types of 404(b) evidence offered - Tapia's testimony about the 
relationships and methods involved in the ongoing methamphetamine trafficking 
operation between Cardoza, Juan, and Tapia, and testimony that over one pound of 
methamphetamine was seized from Cardoza's pick-up truck at Juan's residence in 
Nyssa, Oregon shortly after Cardoza was arrested in Nampa. (R., pp.67-68; Tr., 
p.147, L.3 - p.148, L.9.) 
At trial, the following testimony and evidence was presented. Tapia contacted 
Sgt. Christensen after being stopped for driving without privileges, and offered to 
cooperate with law enforcement, saying he knew a source of methamphetamine 
from California named "El Primo." (Tr., p.162, L.1 - p.163, L.18.) Tapia was 
introduced to Juan and El Primo through a prison connection, and together the three 
engaged in the business of trafficking in methamphetamine, from a few ounces up to 
a pound. (Tr., p.214, L.5. - p.217, L.23.) Tapia described the method of operation 
the three men used. Either Juan or El Primo would stay here and the other would go 
to Modesto, California (where they were from), and pick up the "product." (Tr., 
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p.218, Ls.7-10.) Tapia would contact El Primo and Juan through phone or by text to 
do business, and he would communicate using a code they had arranged in an 
earlier face-to-face meeting. If Tapia wanted to meet with them he would say, "hey, 
my boss has some work for you, why don't you come down and ... talk to him." 
(Tr., p.218, L.25 - p.219, L.25.) To order methamphetamine, Tapia would tell El 
Primo or Juan a specific number of days of work available to them, the number of 
days being code for how many ounces of methamphetamine he was requesting. 
(Tr., p.219, Ls.8-17.) Tapia supplied Sgt. Christensen with the phone numbers of El 
Primo. (Tr., p.164, Ls.3-4.) Tapia said he had seen El Primo drive a green Yukon, 
but had never seen him with a California vehicle. (Tr., p.225, Ls.8-19.) El Primo told 
him he doesn't drive California vehicles because he doesn't want to draw suspicion 
of why "a car from California [would] be coming and going to Idaho, to and from 
Idaho." (Tr., p.225, L.20 - p.26, L.3.) 
At Sgt. Christensen's direction, Tapia contacted El Primo and arranged to 
meet him on May 1ih (2011) at the Karcher Mall in Nampa and buy one pound of 
methamphetamine from him. (Tr., p. 165, Ls.17-24; p.170, Ls.3-9; p.220, L.8 -
p.221, L.21; p.230, Ls.9-13.) Prior to May 11, Sgt. Christensen had been able to 
determine where Juan was living. (Tr., p.170, Ls.16-18.) On the morning of May 
1 ih, Tapia met with Sgt. Christensen, and together they drove to a Home Depot 
parking lot near the mall. (Tr., p.173, Ls.22-24; p.223, L.5 - p.224, L.9.) Sgt. 
Christensen sent officers to where Juan was working, and also placed them around 
the Karcher Mall. (Tr., p.171, L.18- p.172, L.1.) Tapia kept texting El Primo, and at 
about 9:57 a.m. El Primo texted back "that he was going to be there and he was 
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going to meet [Tapia] in the parking lot." (Tr., p.224, L.18 - p.225, L.4.) Several 
minutes later, El Primo texted Tapia that he would be there in about ten or fifteen 
minutes. (Tr., p.175, Ls.2-4; p.227, Ls.6-11.) Tapia and Sgt. Christensen began to 
watch for a green Yukon, and Tapia saw it pass right in front of where they were at 
the Home Depot. (Tr., p.175, Ls.8-15; p.227, Ls.15-25.) 
The Yukon went behind a Burlington store to park, and Tapia lost sight of it 
momentarily. (Tr., p.175, Ls.16-22; p.228, Ls.4-10.) The Yukon was followed into 
the parking lot by a red Mazda, and when the Yukon parked, the Mazda parked and 
the driver (Trinidad Cardenas Cardoza 1) got out and opened the hood of his car. 
(Tr., p.178, Ls.23-25; p.191, L.17 - p.192, L.4; p.245, L.7 - p.246, L.5.) Tapia 
received a text from El Primo saying "he thought there was a suspicious vehicle so 
he wasn't going to park where he normally does," and he parked "down a ways 
more." (Tr., p.228, Ls.17-24.) Sgt. Christensen and Tapia moved to a trailer park to 
further observe the Yukon, which was parked right in front of them in the mall 
parking lot, and Tapia could see that El Primo, the Defendant, was the driver. (Tr., 
p.176, L.20 - p.178, L.13; p.229, L.5 - p.230, L.8.) When the Yukon moved, it was 
again followed by the Mazda. (Tr., p.246, Ls.5-16.) According to l.S.P. Detective 
Kenneth White, who was observing the parking area of the mall, after the two 
vehicles moved, the driver of the Mazda appeared to position his car to allow him to 
watch the Yukon as a "countersurveillance" measure common during drug deals. 
(Tr., p.246, L.5 - p.247, L.12.) 
1 Sgt. Christensen testified at trial that "El Primo" means cousin, but could have 
other meanings, and that he believed Trinidad, Juan, and Martin Cardoza are all 
related to each other. (Tr., p.209, Ls.15-17.) 
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At Sgt. Christensen's direction, the driver and only occupant of the Yukon, 
Cardoza ("El Primo") was arrested, as well as the driver of the red Mazda, Trinidad 
Cardenas Cardoza, who had followed the Yukon into the mall parking lot. (Tr., 
p.179, L.5 - p.180, L.17; p.191, L.17 - p.192, L.4; p.208, Ls.9-11; p.247, L.19 -
p.248, L.12; p.281, Ls.14-15.) Sgt. Christensen had Tapia call the phone number for 
El Primo, and one of the cell phones setting inside the Yukon rang. (Tr., p.182, Ls.7-
20; p.258, Ls.3-16.) Upon viewing the passenger side floorboard of the Yukon from 
outside, officers saw a Ziploc baggie, covered partially by a newspaper, which 
appeared to contained methamphetamine. (Tr., p.182, L.21 - p.183, L.19; p.259, 
Ls.1-16; p.266, L.4 - p.267, L.6.) The baggie was seized and at trial the Idaho State 
Police forensic chemist who tested the substance confirmed the substance was 
methamphetamine which weighed 420 grams. (Tr., p.330, L.19 - p.332, L.12.) 
Cardoza was searched after he was taken into custody, and in his left jeans pocket 
was $1,520, and in the right pocket was $148. (Tr., p.282, L.10 - p.283, L.3.) 
Officers also located and arrested Juan Cardoza. (Tr., p.170, L.16 - p.171, 
L.24; p.287, Ls.13-22.) After Juan's arrest, officers from the Idaho State Police and 
the High Desert Task Force obtained a search warrant for his residence at a trailer 
park in Nyssa, Oregon, and for Cardoza's pick-up truck also at that same residence. 
(Tr., p.288, L.16 - p.290, L.9.) Inside the house, officers located the title to the 
green Yukon in the living on top of a freezer, with Trinidad Cardoza listed as the 
owner. (Tr., p.304, L.17 - p.305, L.9.) During the search of Cardoza's pick-up, 
officers found and seized (1) a plastic bag from the locked glove box that contained 
what appeared to be methamphetamine, and (2) multiple baggies of apparent 
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methamphetamine hidden inside the air bag cover, as well as a grocery sack with a 
"cutting agent" and a digital scale. (Tr., p.290, L.14 - p.293, L.22.) During trial, the 
forensic chemist for the Oregon State Police Crime Lab confirmed that the 
substance found in the five baggies seized from Cardoza's pick-up was 
methamphetamine which weighed a total of 533 grams. (Tr., p.341, L.11 - p.342, 
L.25.) 
The jury convicted Cardoza of aid and abet trafficking in methamphetamine 
and/or amphetamine. (R., pp.107.) At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the 
state made a verbal request for restitution, pursuant to l.C. § 37-2732(k), for $1,500 
based on the prosecutor's pay for the time spent prosecuting the case. (R., pp.116-
117; Tr., p.395, Ls.5-8.) After Cardoza objected to the restitution request, the district 
court set the matter over for a hearing, and required the parties to submit briefing on 
the issue described as "prosecuting costs." (Tr., p.396, L.25 - p.397, L. 7; p.401, 
Ls.17.) The court sentenced Cardoza to twenty years with twelve years fixed. {R., 
pp.136-137.) Cardoza filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to l.C.R. 
35 (R., pp.140-141), which was denied {R., pp.171-173). After briefs were submitted 
and arguments presented at a hearing, the court denied the state's request for 
restitution based on the prosecutor's time spent in prosecuting the case. (R., 
pp.130-135, 158-166; Tr., p.415, L.7 - p.418, L.8.) Cardoza timely appealed from 
his judgment of conviction (R., pp.152-157), and the state filed a cross-appeal from 
the district court's order denying restitution for the costs of the prosecutor's time 
spent prosecuting the case. 
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ISSUES 
Cardoza states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in permitting the State to introduce 
evidence of prior drug dealings with the confidential informant and 
evidence of other charged crimes in Oregon pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b)? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Cardoza failed to show that the district court erred in admitting I.RE. 
404(b) evidence at trial? 
The state presents the following issue on cross-appeal: 
Did the district court err in denying the state's request for restitution based on 
the prosecutor's time spent prosecuting Cardoza's case? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cardoza Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting I.RE. 
404(b) Evidence At Trial 
A. Introduction 
After the jury was empanelled, a hearing was held on the state's notice of 
intent to use 404(b) evidence. (R., p.67.) At that hearing, the prosecutor provided 
more details about the two types of 404(b) evidence he sought to introduce at trial. 
Jose Tapia would testify that, after being stopped and cited for driving without 
privileges, he asked to cooperate with law enforcement and was introduced to l.S.P. 
Sgt. Jim Christensen. (Tr., p.130, L.20 - p.131, L.2.) Tapia told Sgt. Christensen 
"he had a source of methamphetamine who resided in California that he knew as El 
Primo, that he had been associated with El Primo for approximately a year, that he 
had initially met El Primo through a gentleman that he knew as Juan, and he was 
introduced to Juan as a source of supply for methamphetamine. Juan introduced 
him to El Primo as the ultimate source of methamphetamine." (Tr., p.131, Ls.3-11.) 
The prosecutor further explained what Tapia would testify to: 
Mr. Tapia advised the officers that he had dealt with Mr. El 
Primo on a number of occasions, that El Primo and Juan ran a 
methamphetamine distribution ring that brought drugs from California 
up here to the Treasure Valley. 
El Primo would come up here to Idaho when called with an 
order. He would go and meet with Juan at Juan's residence. He 
would bring the methamphetamine with him, and he would bring 
additional methamphetamine to drop off for Juan so that Juan would 
have a supply on hand if Mr. Tapia needed additional 
methamphetam ine. 
El Primo would meet with Juan before meeting with Mr. Tapia. 
They dealt in codes. Mr. Tapia would call down and say, hey, I have 
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work for sixteen days, as an example, meaning he needed sixteen 
ounces of substance, and then those ounces would be brought up to 
Idaho from California by El Primo. 
El Primo would meet with Juan. They would then call Mr. Tapia 
and communicate with him either on cell phone or text. They would 
arrange a meeting place. That meeting place would be set, and then 
El Primo would drive over to meet with Mr. Tapia utilizing vehicles that 
were registered here in the valley and not his own vehicle registered 
from California. 
Mr. Tapia told Sergeant Christensen that the vehicle that he had 
last known El Primo to use was a green GMC Yukon registered to a 
family member.[21 
(Tr., p.131, L.12 - p.132, L.15.) The prosecutor argued that, because Cardoza's trial 
counsel's jury voir dire "put intent and knowledge of the existence of the drugs and 
what the intent to do with those drugs [sic] squarely at issue" (see Tr., p.109, L.14 -
p.111, L.5 (asking if jurors always know what is inside a borrowed car)), evidence of 
Cardoza's "past practices of the ongoing enterprise ... goes squarely to that issue." 
(Tr., p.136, Ls.6-16.) The prosecutor reiterated (from the notice of intent to use 
404(b) evidence) that the evidence was also relevant to show preparation, plan, and 
absence of mistake. (Tr., p.136, Ls.17-23.) 
Before describing the second proffer of 404(b) evidence, the prosecutor 
outlined the facts directly leading to Cardoza's arrest on May 12, 2012, for 
transporting about one pound of methamphetamine to the Karcher Mall parking lot to 
2 According to the prosecutor's 404(b) offer of proof, the Yukon driven by Cardoza 
was registered to Trinidad Cardenas Cardoza, the driver of the red Mazda. (Tr., 
p.134, L.12 - p.135, L.3.) 
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fill an order placed by Tapia.3 The second type of 404(b) evidence was based on 
the coordinated effort of Idaho and Oregon law enforcement officers in finding one 
pound of methamphetamine in Cardoza's pick-up truck in Nyssa, Oregon shortly 
after Cardoza was arrested in Nampa. The prosecutor explained: 
After [methamphetamine was found in the Yukon], the officers 
went to try to find Juan. They found him and arrested him at his 
workplace and they went to what they believed to be his trailer in 
Nampa and were told, nope, he doesn't live here anymore, he moved 
to Oregon. And that's where the Oregon side of this case comes into 
play. 
Sergeant Christensen contacted Detective Brad Williams. They 
tracked down a location where they believed Juan Cardenas Cardozo 
3 The prosecutor described the facts leading to Cardoza's arrest as follows: 
Tapia called and texted El Primo to see if he could bring a pound of 
methamphetamine to Idaho for Tapia to purchase. (Tr., p.133, Ls.4-7.) On May 12,· 
2011, "Tapia coded-messaged El Primo that he wanted to meet him at the Karcher 
Mall to do their business." (Tr., p.133, Ls.8-11.) At about 10:00 a.m., Tapia was 
with Sgt. Christensen in the Sergeant's vehicle when Tapia received cell phone and 
text messages from El Primo saying he was on his way, and would be at the mall in 
ten minutes. (Tr., p.133, Ls.17-21.) As Sgt. Christensen watched a green GMC 
Yukon drive through the mall parking lot, Tapia stated "that's El Primo." (Tr., p.133, 
Ls.22-24.) The Yukon went to the back side of the mall and parked, and a small red 
Mazda, which was following it, parked about 50 yards away. (Tr., p.133, L.24 -
p.134, L.3) The driver of the Mazda, Trinidad Cardenas Cardoza, got out of his car, 
opened the hood, and "stood there watching the Yukon." (Tr., p.134, Ls.3-16.) 
Tapia made a phone call, and was told "we're here, but I'm feeling nervous, I'm 
going to move," and at about the same time the Yukon moved across the parking lot 
and parked near a trailer court, and the Mazda also turned around and parked. (Tr., 
p.134, Ls.6-7.) 
Sgt. Christensen had a detective stop and detain both drivers; Trinidad 
Cardenas Cardoza (Mazda), and Cardoza (Yukon), who Tapia had identified as El 
Primo. (Tr., p.134, Ls.12-16.) After Lt. Catlin spotted two phones setting on the 
driver's seat of the Yukon, he had Tapia again call the phone number (presumably 
for El Primo), and one of the phones on the seat rang. (Tr., p.134, Ls.17-22.) Two 
officers looked on the passenger side floorboard, and underneath some paper they 
found a one-pound package of crystal methamphetamine. (Tr., p.134, L.23 - p.135, 
L.2.) The Yukon was registered to Trinidad Cardenas Cardoza. (Tr., p.135, Ls.2-3.) 
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to live at, and the number right off the top of my head is escaping me. 
It's 1720, but I don't remember the street address yet. But parked in 
front of that address, which subsequently was searched and found to 
be Juan and Trinidad's residence, was a white Ford pickup with 
California plates registered to Martin Cardenas Cardoza. 
Concealed in that vehicle registered to Martin Cardenas 
Cardoza was approximately 520 grams of crystal methamphetamine 
packaged similarly to the one-pound package that was in the Yukon at 
the time Martin Cardenas Cardoza was driving that Yukon. 
(Tr., p.135, Ls.4-23.) In addition to the state's notice of intent to use 404(b) 
evidence, which asserted the Oregon evidence was relevant to show intent, 
knowledge, and common scheme under Rule 404(b) (R., p.52), the prosecutor 
argued at the hearing that the evidence showing over one pound of 
methamphetamine was seized from Cardozo's pick-up truck in Oregon shortly after 
his arrest in Nampa was inextricably intertwined "with the drugs that were seized 
from the GMC Yukon this defendant was driving[.]" (Tr., p.137, Ls.12.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the state's 404(b) motion, the district court 
ruled that testimony about the "prior relationship of engaging in the purchase and 
sale of methamphetamine between Mr. Tapia and [Cardoza]" was relevant to show 
knowledge and intent, and was not overly prejudicial. (Tr., p.147, Ls.3-11; p.148, 
Ls.6-9.) The court similarly concluded that 404(b) evidence about the 
methamphetamine found in Cardoza's truck at Juan's residence in Nyssa, Oregon 
was relevant and admissible, saying "it goes to intent and knowledge, it goes to 
preparation, it goes to plan, it goes to absence of mistake in this case[,]" and is not 
"sq inflammatory that it would lead a jury to convict." (Tr., p.147, Ls.15-20.) 
11 
On appeal, Cardoza argues that the district court erred when it admitted 
l.R.E. 404(b) evidence of prior drug dealings with Tapia because: (1) he "did not 
affirmatively place his intent at issue, but rather, argued the State lacked evidence 
and failed to prove that Mr. Cardoza knowingly possessed a controlled substance," 
(2) "guilty intent [is] proven by proving the act, and evidence of other crimes [is] not 
necessary or admissible to establish the accused's intent[,]" (3) the 404(b) evidence 
is not "so inseparably connected to the charged conduct that it must be admitted in 
order to communicate the full story[,]" (4) the district court failed to determine 
"whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; the first 
part of the first tier of the Grist inquiry[,]" and (5) "evidence of prior drug dealings was 
only relevant to suggest propensity." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) In regard to the 
methamphetamine found in Cardoza's truck in Oregon shortly after his arrest, 
Cardoza contends such evidence was only used to show his propensity to commit 
the charged offense, and that the district court failed to properly balance its 
prejudicial value against the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) 
Cardoza is precluded from challenging the district court's "relevance" 
determination regarding the 404(b) evidence by Tapia about Cardoza's ongoing 
methamphetamine trafficking relationship with him under the invited error doctrine. 
Further, contrary to Cardoza's arguments, the district court correctly admitted both 
sets of 404(b) evidence at trial. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the Supreme 
Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis. The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (1) 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) 
whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the 
crime charged, other than propensity. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1188 (2009). Such evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably 
conclude the act occurred and the defendant was the actor. il;l The appellate court 
will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been 
established by sufficient evidence as it does all factual findings by a trial court. State 
v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009). The appellate 
court will defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789, 948 P.2d 
127, 144 (1997); Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. Whether evidence is 
relevant is an issue of law. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 
657 (Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, when considering admission of evidence of prior 
bad acts, the appellate court exercises free review of the trial court's relevancy 
determination. il;l 
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 
Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. When reviewing this tier the appellate court uses an 
abuse of discretion standard. il;l When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: 
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(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
C. Cardoza Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Challenging The 
Relevance Of Evidence About His Ongoing Methamphetamine Trafficking 
Relationship With Tapia 
Cardoza makes several arguments about why evidence of his ongoing 
methamphetamine trafficking relationship with Tapia was not relevant, and therefore, 
inadmissible under l.R.E. 404(b).5 (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) However, Cardoza's 
arguments contesting the district court's relevance finding are barred by the invited 
error doctrine. 
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error 
when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v. Norton, 
151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Atkinson, 124 
Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). "One may not complain of 
errors one has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d 
at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. 
Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). A review of the 
5 The four arguments Cardoza presents challenging the district court's relevance 
determination are: (1) he did not affirmatively place his intent at issue, (2) because 
guilty intent is proven by proving the act, evidence of other crimes is not admissible 
to establish intent, (3) the evidence is not inseparably connected to the charged 
conduct, and (4) evidence of prior drug dealings was only relevant to show 
propensity, which is improper. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
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record in this case shows that Cardoza's claims that the district court erred in finding 
testimony about his ongoing methamphetamine trafficking relationship with Tapia 
relevant to issues other than propensity is barred under the doctrine of invited error. 
At the conclusion of the 404(b) motion hearing, Cardoza's trial counsel 
agreed with the prosecutor that testimony by Tapia about Cardoza's "past practices, 
past incidents of drug transactions between him and El Primo" was material and 
relevant to show intent. (Tr., p.138, Ls.1-6; p.139, Ls.1-7.) She stated: 
In [State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 
1996)], the court laid out a two-tiered test for bad acts evidence. The 
statements show that the evidence is relevant to a material issue 
concerning the crime charged. Here I think the State makes that 
showing. They're saying it's relevant to intent, and that is an intrinsic 
element of the crime that's been charged against my client. 
(Tr., p.139, Ls.1-7 (emphasis added).) Because the record shows that Cardoza 
conceded that evidence of his ongoing methamphetamine trafficking relationship 
with Tapia was relevant to show intent (and, necessarily, also knowledge), 
Cardoza's appellate arguments otherwise are barred by the doctrine of invited error. 
D. Cardoza Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Not Determining 
Whether There Was Sufficient Evidence To Establish The Prior Bad Acts As 
Fact 
Cardoza argues, in reference to the state's 404(b) evidence of his ongoing 
drug trafficking relationship with Tapia, "as was the case in [State v. Naranjo, 152 
Idaho 134, 141, 267 P.3d 721, 728 (Ct. App. 2011)], 'the district court made no 
determination as to whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad 
acts as fact; the first part of the first tier of the Grist inquiry."' (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
Although the district court did not specifically articulate that a jury could reasonably 
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conclude that the alleged 404(b) acts proffered by the state actually occurred, it was 
not required to do so. 
In State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 151, 254 P.3d 47, 52 (Ct. App. 2011), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
While Gomez argues that the court was required to make a 
specific finding, on the record, as to whether a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the prior acts occurred and that the defendant was the 
actor, such a procedure is not always required. This Court recently 
addressed a similar argument in Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 233 
P.3d 164 (Ct. App. 2010). In that case, this Court clarified that the 
district court is only required to make a specific articulation as to 
whether the prior conduct occurred if that question is squarely at issue. 
Cooke, 149 Idaho at 240, 233 P.3d at 171. If the question is at issue, 
a specific articulation is necessary for the determination of relevance. 
Id. Gomez did not argue below that the other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
did not occur; rather, he argued that they were not relevant to any 
issue other than propensity and that the prejudice of that evidence 
outweighed its probative value. As such, the court was never called 
upon to make a determination on the record as to whether the 
uncharged acts occurred. Therefore, the issue of whether the 
uncharged misconduct occurred was not before the district court, and 
no specific articulation was required. 
As in Gomez, because the question of whether a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the uncharged misconduct occurred was never squarely at issue in the 
district court, the court was not required to make such a specific finding. Cardoza's 
argument is unfounded. 
E. Cardoza Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Determining That 
The Proffered Evidence Was Relevant Under l.R.E. 404(b) 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show he committed the crime fowhich he 
is on trial. Grist, 14 7 Idaho at 52, 205 P .3d at 1188. However, such evidence is 
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admissible for other purposes, including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. l.R.E. 
404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 
Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is 
admissible if (a) it is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's 
character, and (b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially 
outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 
670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 
956, 964-65 (2003). 
Here, as found by the district court, both sets of 404(b) evidence were 
relevant to show Cardoza's intent and knowledge that he was transporting the 
methamphetamine found in the Yukon. Tapia's testimony that he, Juan, and 
Cardoza associated together to traffic in methamphetamine, and the methods used 
in their illicit drug operation, showed that Cardoza not only knew about the (nearly) 
one pound of methamphetamine seized from the Yukon he drove into the Nampa 
mall parking lot, but that he was intentionally delivering it to Tapia in accordance with 
the set methods used to replenish Tapia's methamphetamine supply as a local 
dealer: Tapia would call or text El Primo in California for a shipment of 
methamphetamine, using code for how much to bring -- e.g., saying "I have work for 
sixteen days ... meaning he needed sixteen ounces of substance, and then those 
ounces would be brought up to Idaho from California by El Primo." (Tr., p.132, Ls.1-
4.) 
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It was common for El Primo to bring more than the requested amount of 
methamphetamine and drop it off with Juan so Juan would be able to supply Tapia 
with more, if needed. (Tr., p.131, Ls.18-23; p.132, L.24 - p.133, L.3.) When El 
Primo would get to Idaho, he would meet with Juan before setting up a meeting with 
Tapia, and then they would call or text Tapia to arrange where to meet. (Tr., p.131, 
L.17 - p.132, L.12.) Cardoza would drive to the meeting place using vehicles that 
were registered in Idaho - not California - to avoid suspicion, and, according to 
Tapia, the last vehicle Cardoza drove was a green GMC Yukon registered to a 
family member. (Tr., p.132, Ls.8-12.) Those aspects of the ongoing drug trafficking 
operation show that Cardoza knowingly and intentionally transported 
methamphetamine to the Nampa mall to deliver to Tapia when he was stopped by 
law enforcement officers. The district court correctly determined that evidence of the 
methods used in the group's ongoing drug trafficking operation was relevant to show 
Cardoza's intent and knowledge with regard to the methamphetamine seized from 
the Yukon he drove to the Nampa mall. 
The district court also concluded that evidence showing over one pound of 
methamphetamine was found in Cardoza's pick-up parked at Juan's residence in 
Nyssa, Oregon shortly after Cardoza was arrested in Nampa was admissible under 
Rule 404(b). (Tr., p.147, Ls.15-20.) Tapia's anticipated testimony that Cardoza 
would not deliver methamphetamine to Tapia while driving a vehicle with California 
license plates, and that Cardoza would often bring more methamphetamine to Idaho 
than Tapia ordered and would leave the extra amount with Juan in case Tapia 
needed more, combined with the fact that a substantial amount of 
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methamphetamine was seized from Tapia's pick-up (with California license plates) at 
Juan's residence shortly after Cardoza was arrested in Nampa, shows that Cardoza 
was following the common scheme or plan used for providing methamphetamine to 
Tapia. As the district court found, the methamphetamine found in Cardoza's truck at 
Juan's residence in Oregon was relevant because "it goes to intent and knowledge, 
it goes to preparation, it goes to plan, it goes to absence of mistake in this case." 
(Tr., p.147, Ls.15-20.) Cardoza has failed to show the district court committed error 
in making that relevance determination under Rule 404(b).6 
6 Cardoza seems to argue that because he "did not affirmatively place his intent at 
issue," the state was not entitled to present 404(b) evidence on intent. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.6.) However, by pleading not guilty and going to trial, Cardoza placed each 
element of the offense in issue. 
Cardoza also cites State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 788, 171 P.3d 1282, 1286 
(Ct. App. 2007), for the principle that '"where the act charged against the defendant 
itself characterizes the offense; thus, guilty intent [is] proven by proving the act, and 
evidence of other crimes [is] not necessary or admissible to establish the accused's 
intent."' (Appellant's Brief, p.6 (quoting Cook, 144 Idaho at 788, 171 P.3d at 1286).) 
Here, intent and knowledge are not proven by the mere commission of the act. Jury 
Instruction No. 10, the elements instruction, has separate findings for the "act" of 
aiding and abetting another to possess or deliver methamphetamine and that "the 
defendant knew it was methamphetamine." (R., p.91.) 
Moreover, in Cook, the court of appeals explained, "[w]hether Cook had 
knowledge of methamphetamine was also not in contention. Cook never claimed 
that he was innocent by reason of not knowing the substance that he "delivered" was 
methamphetamine or not being familiar with methamphetamine in general." Cook, 
144 Idaho at 788, 171 P.3d at 1286.) Conversely, Cardoza contested the 
"knowledge" element by his "not guilty" plea and trial counsel's jury voir dire (see Tr., 
p.109, L.14 - p.111, L.5), and on appeal states that at trial he "argued the State 
lacked evidence and failed to prove that [he] knowingly possessed a controlled 
substance" (Appellant's Brief, p.6). In short, the Cook principle does not apply to 
Cardoza. 
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F. The Methamphetamine Seized From Cardoza's Pick-up Truck In Oregon Was 
Inextricably Intertwined With The Methamphetamine Seized From The Yukon 
Cardoza Drove, Therefore, Rule 404(b) Does Not Apply 
Further, as the prosecutor contended, the methamphetamine seized from 
Cardoza's pick-up truck parked at Juan's residence in Nyssa, Oregon was 
inextricably intertwined with the methamphetamine seized from the Yukon he drove 
to the Nampa mall. (Tr., p.137, L.8-14.) Tapia's anticipated testimony showed it 
was normal for Cardoza to come to Idaho not only to fill Tapia's order for 
methamphetamine, but to also bring additional methamphetamine and leave it with 
Juan to supply Tapia "so that they could continue on with the transactions without 
having to constantly move back and for the between California and Idaho." (Tr., 
p.132, L.24 - p. 133, L.3.) The proffered evidence showed that the 
methamphetamine Cardoza transported to the Nampa mall, and the 
methamphetamine that remained in Cardoza's pick-up truck parked at Juan's 
Oregon residence, were two parts of the methamphetamine Cardoza brought with 
him from California in response to Tapia's order. 
Evidence is intrinsic when it and evidence of the crime charged are 
inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part of a single criminal episode, or it was a 
necessary preliminary to the crime charged." U.S. v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2005)); 
accord U.S. v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Alexander, 331 
F.3d 116, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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Here, the methamphetamine seized from Cardoza's pick-up truck in Oregon 
was part and parcel and intrinsic to the crime charged. After Tapia placed an order 
for Cardoza to transport one pound of methamphetamine from California to Idaho, 
as was Cardoza's practice, he brought an additional pound of methamphetamine to 
give to Juan in order to fill additional methamphetamine requests by Tapia. The 
admissibility of the evidence is, therefore, subject only to the requirements of l.R.E. 
401 and 403. State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Ct. App. 
2002) (analyzing statements made during sexual battery under Rule 404(b) and 
concluding the statements were not offered for an improper purpose since "Rule 
404(b) does not prevent the introduction of other misconduct evidence if the 
misconduct was so interconnected with the charged offense that a complete account 
of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure of the 
uncharged misconduct"). 
Because the methamphetamine seized from Cardoza's pick-up truck in 
Nyssa, Oregon was part of the same criminal episode initiated by Tapia's order for 
Cardoza to transport methamphetamine to Idaho, it was intrinsic to the crime 
involving the methamphetamine seized from the Yukon. Therefore, Rule 404(b) 
does not apply to the Oregon evidence. Although not the basis for the district court's 
404(b) ruling, Cardoza's argument should be rejected on this alternative basis. 
State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707, 712 (2010) (affirming denial of a 
motion on the correct theory, although one not reached by the trial court); McKinney 
v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (if the trial court reaches the 
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correct result by erroneous theory, the appellate court will affirm upon the correct 
theory). 
G. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Probative Value Of The 
404(b) Evidence Was Not Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair 
Prejudice 
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 
Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. As explained in Gomez, even if evidence of other 
misconduct tends to show a defendant's propensity to commit a crime, it may still be 
admissible for another proper purpose: 
While we recognize that Grist denotes a shift from [State v. 
Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991 )] and its progeny, we do 
not read that case as prohibiting admissibility of prior bad act evidence 
entirely. Rather, the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts hinges 
on the question of whether "its probative value is entirely dependent 
upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage 
in such behavior." Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 (emphasis 
added). If it is, the evidence is inadmissible as "complete reliance 
upon propensity evidence is not a permissible basis for the admission 
of evidence of uncharged conduct." Id. (emphasis added). In other 
words, the fact that evidence of prior bad acts tends to demonstrate 
the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior does not 
necessarily preclude its admissibility. Although evidence of prior bad 
acts may tend to show a defendant's propensity to commit a crime, 
such evidence may still be admissible under l.R.E. 404(b) if it is 
relevant for another purpose. 
When reviewing the second tier of I.RE. 44(b) analysis, the appellate courts 
use an abuse of discretion standard. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
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boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(1989). 
The record reflects that the district court correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333. 
The court acknowledged the "two-tiered test that was clearly discussed in Canelo 
and other cases," and that, if evidence is deemed relevant, the court would "have to 
go back to whether the probative value outweighs the unfair prejudice .... " (Tr., 
p.146, Ls.3-16.) The court first concluded that testimony about the ongoing 
methamphetamine trafficking relationship between Tapia and Cardoza was not "so 
inflammatory that it would lead a jury to convict Mr. Cardenas Cardoza. He would 
still be able to make his argument of a lack of knowledge, but it specifically goes to 
that issue. And I find it relevant, probative, and I do not find that it is overly 
prejudicial." (Tr., p.147, Ls.3-11.) The court similarly concluded that 404(b) 
evidence about the methamphetamine found in Cardoza's truck at Juan's residence 
in Nyssa, Oregon was relevant and admissible, "it goes to intent and knowledge, it 
goes to preparation, it goes to plan, it goes to absence of mistake in this case[,]" but 
is not "so inflammatory that it would lead a jury to convict." (Tr., p.147, Ls.15-20.) 
Even without the district court's findings, in balancing the prejudicial value of 
the evidence against its probative value, this Court can conclude that its probative 
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value is not substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice. The evidence 
probatively shows that, based on the ongoing drug trafficking relationship between 
Cardoza, Juan, and Tapia, Cardoza had full knowledge of the methamphetamine 
seized from the Yukon he drove to the Nampa mall, and was intentionally 
transporting it to Tapia at the time. The methamphetamine found in Cardoza's pick-
up truck in Nyssa, Oregon is probative because it validates not only Cardoza's intent 
and knowledge of the methamphetamine in the Yukon, it also substantiates the 
common scheme or plan of the three participants to traffic in methamphetamine -
which Cardoza operated under in transporting both sets of methamphetamine from 
California at the same time. Although it might be prejudicial in the sense of being 
damaging to Cardoza for a jury to know about the ongoing methamphetamine 
trafficking arrangement Cardoza had with Juan and Tapia, such information would 
not be unfairly prejudicial. 
As discussed, the methods used by Cardoza to transport methamphetamine 
from California to Idaho, and to provide an extra supply for Juan to be able to meet 
Tapia's needs, show that the offense on May 12, 2011 did not occur in isolation; 
rather, it was done within the context of an ongoing scheme or plan adopted by 
Cardozo's drug trafficking enterprise. Indeed, it would have been next to impossible 
to explain Tapia's actions in volunteering to be a confidential informant, ordering one 
pound of methamphetamine from Cardoza in California using "code" talk, and 
arranging to meet Cardoza at the Nampa mall to receive the methamphetamine, 
without explaining the true nature of the relationship between the three men, and 
their established methods of working together in order to traffic in 
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methamphetamine. Cardoza has failed to show any error in the district court's 
determination that the probative value of the 404(b) evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
H. Any Error In The Admission Of The l.R.E. 404(b) Evidence Is Harmless 
Even if the district court erred in its decision to permit the state to present 
404(b) evidence, any such error was harmless. Error in the admission of evidence 
will be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, "that there was no reasonable possibility that the event complained of 
contributed to the conviction." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 341, 193 P.3d 878, 
888 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). Based on the strength of the state's case at 
trial, as reflected in Statement of Facts, supra, it is highly unlikely the jury convicted 
Cardoza based upon the testimony of Tapia about his ongoing relationship with 
Cardoza and Juan in trafficking in methamphetamine, or because of the 
methamphetamine that was seized from Cardoza's pick-up in Oregon. The jury was 
presented with Tapia's testimony, verified in large part by Sgt. Christensen, about 
the arrangements he made with Cardoza to meet at the Nampa mall, and the 
uncontradicted testimony concerning Cardoza's driving into the mall parking lot as 
arranged, followed by the red Mazda driven by Trinidad Cardenas Cardoza 
(obviously acting as a look-out), with nearly a pound of methamphetamine on the 
passenger side floorboard, covered partially by a piece of paper. Because Cardoza 
has failed to establish any error in the district court's admission of the I.RE. 404(b) 
evidence, he is not entitled to relief. 
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
The District Court Erred In Denying The State's Request For Restitution Based On 
The Prosecutor's Time Spent Prosecuting Cardoza's Case 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied the state's request for restitution, made pursuant to 
l.C. § 37-2732(k), for $1,500 based on the prosecutor's pay for the time spent 
prosecuting Cardoza's case. (R., pp.116-117, 130-135, 158-166; Tr., p.395, Ls.5-8; 
p.415, L. 7 - p.418, L.8.) At the end of the restitution hearing, the court explained: 
The State is terming the $1,500 as prosecution costs, but I view 
them as attorney's fees. And attorney's fees are addressed throughout 
the Idaho statutes and, actually, this Court spends a considerable 
amount of time determining attorney's fees, prevailing parties, and 
who's entitled to thereto, but it's normally in the civil arena. 
I conclude that the failure of the legislature to include the term 
"attorney's fees" is a basis that would not be appropriate to award the 
prosecutor's costs. If the legislature had intended for attorney's fees to 
be included, then they should have included them. The statute does 
not discuss them, and certainly the statute could be amended by the 
legislature if that was deemed necessary. 
As a result, I'm going to deny the $1,500 prosecution costs in 
this case. 
(Tr., p.419, L.16-p.420, L.7.) 
Given the plain meaning of the statute, the district court erred in denying the 
state's request. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
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798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 
710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The District Court Erred By Finding That The Hours The Prosecutor Spent 
Prosecuting Cardoza's Case Are Not Recoverable To The County As 
Restitution Under l.C. 372732(k) 
Rather than re-casting the state's request for "prosecution costs" as a request 
for "attorney's fees,"8 the district court was required to act within the statutory 
boundaries of the applicable restitution statutes. See State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 
884, 886, 231 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 
35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002)). The interpretation of a statute must begin 
with its literal words. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003). Those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. & Where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 
685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996). 
Here the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. 
The applicable statute allows the state to recover "restitution for costs 
incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation." l.C. § 37-
2732(k). "Law enforcement agencies" includes "county and city prosecuting attorney 
offices." Id. "Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the 
8 Inasmuch as l.C. § 37-2732(k) only allows law enforcement agencies to recoup 
their costs of investigation and prosecution, the legislative omission of the phrase 
"attorney's fees" merely evinces an intent to not extend the statute to recoupment of 
defense attorney fees. 
27 
purchase of evidence, travel and per diem ... , and any other investigative or 
prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees." Id. 
(emphasis added). The plain language of this statute allows the county to recoup 
the costs of "prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of 
employees." Id. The deputy prosecutor is obviously an employee of the 
"prosecution," and is paid a "regular salary" that can be prorated to an hourly amount 
of compensation. In addition to the above argument, the state incorporates and 
relies upon, as if fully set forth herein, the state's "Memorandum in Support of 
Restitution for Costs of Prosecution on Drug Distribution Cases" (R., pp.130-135), 
attached as Exhibit A 
Because the plain language of the statute allows the county prosecutor's 
office to be reimbursed for its costs in prosecuting Cardoza's case, $1,500, the 
district court committed reversible error by denying the state's motion for such costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Cardoza's conviction for aid 
and abet trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine. Additionally, the 
state requests this Court to reverse the district court's denial of the state's request 
for restitution for the costs of the prosecutor's time in prosecuting Cardoza's case. 
DATED this 25th day of June 2013. 
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correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
JEFFREY BROWNSON 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT 
P.O. BOX 2772 
BOISE, ID 83701 
John . McKinney 
Dep y Attorney General 
JCM/pm 
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Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-73 91 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Martin Cardenas Cardoza, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR201 l-13216 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RESTITUTION FOR COSTS OF 
PROSECUTION ON DRUG 
DISTRIBUTION CHARGE 
COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, on behalf of the State of Idaho, who files this 
Memorandum in Support of Restitution for Costs of Prosecution on a Drug Distribution Charge 
against the Defendant MARTIN CARDENAS CARDOZA. The State has previously supplied 
Affidavits in support of said restitution requests. 
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(k) provides the basis for an order ofrestitution in cases 
involving the distribution of coi;itrolled substances. The statute provides that: 
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chavter or upon 
conviction of a felony pursuant to the "racketeering act," section 18-7804, Idaho Code, or 
the money laundering and illegal investment provisions of section 18-8201, Idaho Code, 
the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in 
investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited 
to, the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office of the 
attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices. Costs shall 
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include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and 
per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses throughout the course of the 
investigation, hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution expenses 
actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees. In the case of 
reimbursement to the Idaho state police, those moneys shall be paid to the Idaho state 
police for deposit into the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement 
donation fund created in section 57-816, Idaho Code. In the case ofreimbursement to the 
office of the attorney general, those moneys shall be paid to the general fund. A 
conviction for the purposes of this section means that the person has pled guilty or has 
been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheldjudgment(s). 
See, IDAHO CODE SECTION 37-2732(k) (2012)(emphasis added). 
In the present case, the Defendant Martin Cardenas Cardoza has been found guilty of 
Aiding and Abetting Trafficking in Methamphetamine in violation of Idaho Code Section 37-
2732B(a)( 4) and 18-204. Thus, the Defendant has been convicted of a felony violation of the 
Uniform Controlled Substance Act chapter 37. The restitution provisions of Section 37-2732(k) 
are therefore in effect. 
The State has requested restitution for "costs of prosecution" in the amount of $1500.00 
and for "lab costs" in the amount of $100.00 in conjunction with the prosecution of this 
Defendant. The Idaho State Police, the investigating agency, is requesting "costs of 
investigation" in the amount of $6,413.99 for investigator expenses. Under the restitution 
provision, each of the three agencies- the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory and the Idaho State Police investigations division- are 
named as agencies authorized to seek restitution for expenses in investigating and prosecuting 
drug cases. The statute specifically identifies "costs" as including any investigative or 
prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees. 
In State v .McCool, 139 Idaho 808, 87 P.3d 295 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals determined that Section 37-2732(k) is broad in its scope: 
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"In this appeal, the State advances no argument that the payments ordered by the 
court were authorized by§ 19-5304. Instead, the State suggests that another statute, LC. 
§ 37-2732(k), empowered the district court to order the payments. The State's position is 
correct insofar as it applies to the order to pay expenses of the prosecutor's office. Section 
37-2732(k) provides in part: 
(k) Upon conviction of a felony violation under this chapter [pertaining to 
controlled substances] ... the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law 
enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies 
shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law 
enforcement agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and city 
prosecuting attorney offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those 
incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement 
officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and 
trials, and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, 
including regular salaries of employees .... A conviction for the purposes of this 
section means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, 
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheldjudgment(s). 
The first sentence of this statute refers to costs incurred in investigating a 
violation, and the statute is most commonly applied through orders to reimburse public 
agencies for such expenses as unrecovered "buy money" used for undercover drug 
purchases, compensation paid to informants, the cost of laboratory analysis of evidence, 
and similar investigative expenses. Nevertheless, the statute specifically provides that 
reimbursable costs include "any other ... prosecution expenses actually incurred, 
including regular salaries of employees." That statutory language is broad enough to 
encompass prosecutorial expenses associated with drug court operations incurred before a 
judgment of conviction has been entered against the defendant. Therefore, that 
component of McCool's judgment and probation order compelling payment of restitution 
to the prosecutor's office was authorized by I.C. § 37-2732(k)." 
See, McCool, 139 Idaho at 809, 87 P.3d at296. If the statute is broad enough to provide 
for prosecution costs attendant to a prosecutors involvement with drug court activities 
concerning a Defendant's pre-sentence participation in a treatment program, then th1::u~tatute is 
surely broad enough to encompass the prosecutor's actual prosecution of a Defendant through a 
jury trial and sentencing proceeding. 
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The Court of Appeals has also determined that the statute must be viewed as a whole, and 
the analysis begins with the literal words which are given their plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning, refusing to construe the plain and unambiguous statutory language. See, State v. 
Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 252 P.3d 563 (Ct. APP. 2010). In Mosqueda, the Court of Appeals 
determined that "costs of investigation" as used in the statute has a specific meaning: 
"It is true that the first sentence of the statute refers to costs incurred in 
investigating a violation, but the statute provides for ),"eimbursement for numerous costs 
that would not, in the everyday use of the term, be considered part of an "investigation." 
Viewing the statute as a whole, it specifically provides for reimbursement for any 
"investigative or prosecution costs actually incurred," with specific authorization for 
recovery of costs incurred at "hearings" and "trials." We conclude, as the district court 
did below, that a reasonable reading of the statute includes costs incurred for law 
enforcement employees' attendance at a restitution hearing. Therefore, that component of 
the order ofrestitution was authorized by I.C. § 37-2732 (k) and no error has been 
shown." 
Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 834-35, 252 P.3d at 567-68. Thus, the plain reading of the 
statute given to it by the Idaho Court of Appeals supports the State's request for Prosecution 
costs attendant to the actual two day trial presented against this Defendant. 
In this case, the State has presented an Affidavit of costs listing a request for $750 per 
day of trial for two days of actual trial. The State has not specifically listed ALL costs attendant 
to the prosecution of this Defendant. The list of pleadings and proceedings required for this case 
include: 
1. Criminal Complaint for in-custody arraignments on May13, 2011. 
2. Attendance at initial appearance before Magistrate George Southworth on May 13, 2011. 
3. Grand Jury proceeding on May 18, 2011 with District Judge Renae Hoff presiding. 
4. Initial appearance on Indictment before Magistrate Dayo Onanobosi on May 19, 2011. 
5. District Court arraignment on May 27, 2011 before District Judge Renae. 
6. Motion to Withdraw on August 26, 2011 before District Judge Renae Hoff. 
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7. Status Conference on September 26, 2011 before District Judge Renae Hoff. 
8. Continued Status Conference/Pretrial on November 4, 2011 before District Judge Renae 
Hoff. 
9. Continued Status Conference/Pretrial on November 18, 2011 before District Judge Renae 
Hoff. 
10. Jury trial for two days on December 6 and 7, 2011 with District Judge Renae Hoff. 
11. Motion to Withdraw on January 27, 2012 before District Judge Renae Hoff. 
12. Sentencing on March 19, 2012 before District Judge Renae Hoff. 
This list does not include the numerous telephone calls to Defense Attorneys Robert Tilley and 
Kathy Edwards, numerous meetings with law enforcement to review their investigative files and 
prepare discovery disclosures, the time spent preparing for Grand Jury presentation of evidence, 
the time spent compiling discovery and preparing all of the documents associated with the case 
or the time spent preparing for the presentation of evidence at trial. 
The undersigned represents that he is a paid public employee of Canyon County, Idaho 
on a yearly salary that is computed at the rate of $48.08 per hour, not including benefits. At that 
hourly rate, the $1500 requested for restitution would equate with approximately 31 hours of 
time in the entire prosecution of this case. The actual trial involved slightly more than 18 hours. 
The request made is reasonable and can be ordered under Section 37-2732(k). The request for 
restitution for law enforcement investigative expenses and for lab costs associated with this case 
are also governed by these same case and statutory precedents. The statute authorizing 
restitution for drug distribution offenses is, by its very terms, applicable to all three requests 
made by the State herein. The State respectfully requests that the Court grant the request and 
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order the Defendant Martin Cardenas Cardoza to provide restitution to the people of Idaho for 
the costs of his prosecution. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was served 
up~>n the attorney for the defendant, the 
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing 
said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's 
Office, on r about th~&f'=--day of 
-L-"-'IF'---=-=---''---'' 2 0 12. 
Deputy Prosecuting Atto 
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